Although there are regulatory obligations put forth by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) that directly govern clinical trials and other investigational therapies, such activity does not occur in a vacuum. There are other regulations and administrative policies that are tangential to the operations of clinical trials in a health system that can have a direct or indirect effect. Regulations such as HHS's Common Rule and Right To Try have been rapidly evolving over the past couple of years. Also rapidly evolving in this timeframe are the federal government's administrative branch policies involving incentives and disincentives for electronic health records as well as how quality is measured electronically. All of this is occurring as the entire health care delivery sector is trying to reinvent itself with both existing and new unexpected players. Thus, while those interested in conducting industry-funded clinical trials in their health system generally know to keep up with FDA, they must also be diligent to see how the greater system is forced to evolve to assure that they remain successful form a regulatory and operational standpoint.
subjects. Although the FDA is an agency that organizationally falls under a Common Rule adopting agency (Department of Health and Human Services), the FDA has existed with similar but independent regulations concerning Informed Consent and Institutional Review Board oversight (respectively 21CFR50 and 21CFR56) . With that said, it is important to note that for many reasons, it is not uncommon for governmental, public, and private institutions to adopt Common Rule provisions voluntarily for nonfederally funded studies which, in effect, imposes an overlap of Common Rule provisions onto FDA-governed studies. Therefore, changes, guidance, and enforcement activities related to the Common Rule, although not directly affecting FDAonly-governed research, tend to eke into both the institution's and IRB's execution of FDA-governed activities. In addition, according to Section 3023 of the 21st Century Cures Act, the Office for Human Research Protections ("OHRP" is HHS agency that writes and enforces the Common Rule) and FDA must, to the extent practical and consistent with their statutory provisions, harmonize their human subject protection regulations within 3 years of the passing of the act (which passed in December 2016). It is currently uncertain as to how the agencies will reconcile the differences between the regulations that must be reconciled. However, there have been major initiatives by OHRP to initiate the changes.
In July 2011, OHRP published an Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking proposing the biggest changes to 45CFR46 (a.k.a. the January 17, 2018, it was published that there was to be a 6-month delay in the effective date (postponing it to July 19, 2018), and on June 18, it was delayed again until January 21, 2019 (although allowing for some minor options to be adopted in the interim). Many aspects of the revised Common Rule are either completely askew of or minimally impactful to FDA-governed studies. However, certain revisions as described below are of key interest, as they undoubtedly will eke into FDA-governed studies at the institution and IRB level.
The revised Common Rule adds four new required elements of consent as specified in Table 1 . The first (45CFR46.116(b)(9)) applies to all research, and the remaining three are to be added when applicable.
As can be clearly seen, each of these generally are attributable to nearly all FDA-governed research and thus would affect its conduct (and post-conduct) when adopted to FDA-governed, industry-funded clinical trials.
As industry-funded clinical trials are often conducted with the intent to publish and/or submit the data to regulatory authorities across the globe, the demands for data transparency make it nearly impossible to commit to not de-identifying the dataset for future use. For example, European Medicines Agency Policy 0070 requires the manufacturer to make anonymized individual level data available, and Health Canada has posted a draft regulation to do the same. Additionally, while some medical journals have required data sharing plans of varying degrees as a condition of publication, effective July 2018 all (approximately 4000) medical journals falling under the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors (ICMJE) will be required to submit a data sharing plan in order to have the clinical trial results considered for publication. Secondary or subsequent use of the data may be prohibited (1) intentionally by the research subject or (2) perhaps even unintentionally by the researchers themselves if the informed consent document from the original research project either does not address secondary use or even has statements implying there will be no such use (and resultantly inhibit a publication or regulatory filing).
It will also be interesting to see how the remaining new statements will affect recruitment into clinical trials should they be adopted. For example, a statement requiring the addressing of any profit sharing plans when biospecimens are used introduces a new dynamic between the patient, provider, and manufacturer rarely addressed before in the consent process. Hypothetically (under the assumption that the status quo of profits not being shared will remain), calling this to the forefront may agitate any distaste for the commercial realities of medicine and negatively affect recruitment.
The remaining requirements similarly add new dynamics and introduce extra-study operational requirements and/or limitations on both the site and manufacturer should they be adopted. 45CFR46.116(b) (9): "One of the following statements about any research that involves the collection of identifiable private information or identifiable biospecimens: (i) A statement that identifiers might be removed from the identifiable private information or identifiable biospecimens and that, after such removal, the information or biospecimens could be used for future research studies or distributed to another investigator for future research studies without additional informed consent from the subject or the legally authorized representative, if this might be a possibility; or (ii) A statement that the subject's information or biospecimens collected as part of the research, even if identifiers are removed, will not be used or distributed for future research studies."
45CFR46.116(c)(7): "A statement that the subject's biospecimens (even if identifiers are removed) may be used for commercial profit and whether the subject will or will not share in this commercial profit."
45CFR46.116(c)(8): "A statement regarding whether clinically relevant research results, including individual research results, will be disclosed to subjects, and if so, under what conditions."
45CFR46.116(c) (9): "For research involving biospecimens, whether the research will (if known) or might include whole genome sequencing (i.e., sequencing of a human germline or somatic specimen with the intent to generate the genome or exome sequence of that specimen).
Broad Consent option, especially about, setting aside the nuances of the identifiability of the information, how an institution offering Broad Consent must be able to have the metadata infrastructure in place to allow the prevention from secondary use (even under an IRB Waiver of Consent/Authorization) of the related information and/or biospecimens pertaining to those who were offered such Broad Consent and refused. This mechanism of protection is growingly complicated in a world where data sharing is becoming more pervasive. In other words, it is not only challenging to conceptually strike the balance of each individual's desire for the use of their data with the necessity of the use of that data for the advancement of medicine.
Even if such a challenge could be met, doing so in a manner that is not cost or operationally prohibitive seems even more the challenge. Expanded Access and how to obtain it, the overarching theme remains that it should not interfere with the clinical development of the investigational drugs. Nevertheless, if a patient wants the product, the provider wants to administer it, the manufacturer is willing to provide it and the FDA is willing to allow it, and the patient can receive it outside of having the institution set up as a site for a clinical trial. 
| ELECTRONIC CLINICAL QUALITY MEASURES (eCQMS)
Over the past decade or so, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) has evolved in their provider "report cards" they post on their website. The report card is not only used by the public to compare a provider's scores against any other on the country, it is also used in certain "value-based purchasing" (a.k.a. "pay for performance") meaning lower scores could translate to lower reimbursement. At the risk of oversimplifying the process, the quality scores are based on how well the provider follows a certain predescribed clinical pathway Fortunately, CMS recognized this and allowed for the exclusion of the clinical trial cases from the denominator of the condition of the measure (ie, a patient on a heart failure clinical trial would not be included in the heart failure denominator but would be included in the influenza vaccination denominator); however, changes to the system have made this impractical. Customarily, to exclude a patient from the denominator, the provider had to have a copy of the signed informed consent document contained within the patient's medical record and documented sufficiently to show that the study was for the indication of the measure. This means that, in addition to the research files, the full consent document (as the signature page alone was generally not enough to justify that the clinical trial was for the same indication) needed to be scanned into the medical record for the human abstracters to verify the exclusion. As imperfect as that process was, the recent required migration from manual (ie, human reviewed) chart abstraction to electronic abstraction (eCQMs) has caused more significant imperfections. While electronic abstraction theoretically saves time and money and helps prevent human interrater error, the current electronic abstraction method is not smart enough to determine if a clinical trial consent form exists and if it does, if it contains the contextual information necessary to exclude the patient from the denominator of the quality measure. Therefore, the more clinical trials a provider does (and follows the protocol and not the measure's clinical pathway), the more their quality measures may not reflect the quality actually provided because they cannot exclude those patients from the denominator. As the percentile numbers can sway based on only one or two patients, bringing clinical trials into the ecosystem may be considered too much of a risk (as the online report cards do not explain this anomaly).
| MEANINGFUL USE AND OTHER EHR USE INCENTIVES
Since the implementation of the Health Information Technology for setting (especially for a large hospital system), it nevertheless is a marching away from meeting the incentive/disincentive criteria such that providers border lining on these thresholds may take this more seriously than those that are not.
| GENERAL BUSINESS AND REGULATORY UNCERTAINTY
There is a subpopulation of patients that migrate towards clinical trials because they are uninsured or underinsured in an effort, in part, to get some care (eg, physical exams and labs) just as there is another subpopulation that migrate away from clinical trials because they are uninsured or underinsured (eg, when the sponsor requires the patient to pay for the routine care affiliated with the study). Similarly, there is a subpopulation that migrate towards clinical trials because they are insured (eg, they hear about the study from their physicians they see regularly and they were able to afford the treatment the trial requires them to have failed first) just as there is a subpopulation that migrate away from trials because they are insured (eg, they prefer treatment over research and they may no longer meet the treatment naivety requirements of the protocol). As a patient's insurance status changes, this may also shift those already enrolled (eg, a rising deductible may make the copays and deductibles of the standard-of-care arm no longer affordable, or perhaps the employer dropped insurance and the patient is now on expanded Medicaid that covers the copays).
Needless to say, a patient's insurance status can affect the recruitment and retention into clinical trials among therapeutic areas (ie, a lifethreatening disease versus a more tolerable disease) as well as geography (eg, a major employer in the area shifts insurance plans).
The cannibalize from the same population (eg, moving a private insurance patient to a study where the sponsor says they cannot pay more than the Medicare rates for the same service). Even with the uncertainty factor stated above, a conservative clinic operator may seek more stability in the "known unknowns" of the more natural extensions such as in the examples above as opposed to entering into the "unknown unknowns" of the clinical trials business and regulatory structure.
Yes, a clinical trial is often touted as "an alternative revenue stream"
and "good for patients" and while that may be true, it is not the only alternative revenue stream that is good for patients that a health care delivery system considers on a routine basis. can bring in providers that traditionally were not ready, willing, and/or able to accommodate clinical trials, they do bring on their own challenges … but that is another article for another time.
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